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India’s	federal	success:	recognition	is	the	way
forward
In	India,	linguistic	reorganisation	solidified	support	for	the	Indian	state	and	the	Indian	nation,	rather	than	leading	to
political	balkanisation	and	the	breakup	of	the	country.	Katharine	Adeney	writes	that	not	only	is	secession	never
the	easy	option,	but	a	rallying	cry	for	secession	will	only	be	successful	if	the	group	feels	its	identity	and	interests
are	not	protected.
Ethnofederalism	(where	the	boundaries	of	at	least	some	of	the	federal	units	coincide	with	‘ethnic’	boundaries)	has
been	contested	as	a	solution	for	diverse	societies	e.g.	Nepal	(where	the	design	and	number	of	units	remains
heavily	contested)	and	Myanmar	(where	ethnic	minority	demands	for	increasing	federalisation	have	had	to	take	a
back	seat	to	the	demands	for	increasing	democracy).
Concerns	are	expressed	that	ethnofederalism	will	increase	pressures	for	secession	and/or	lead	to	increased
violence,	through	increasing	a	sense	of	separateness	of	the	people	living	within	that	territory,	providing	resources
for	political	entrepreneurs	to	mobilize	groups	against	the	centre.	The	recent	independence	vote	in	Catalonia	is	a
case	in	point.
The	“dangers”	of	ethnofederalism
There	are	27	federations	in	the	world	today:	just	over	half	are	ethnofederal.
Federations	in	2017
	 Name	of	state Ethnofederal
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Austria
4 Belgium Yes
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes
6 Brazil
7 Canada Yes
8 Comoros
9 Ethiopia Yes
10 Germany
11 India Yes
12 Iraq	(in	transition) Yes
13 Malaysia Yes
14 Mexico
15 Micronesia
16 Nepal Yes
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17 Nigeria Yes
18 Pakistan Yes
19 Russia Yes
20 St	Kitts	and	Nevis
21 South	Africa Yes
22 Spain Yes
23 Sudan
24 Switzerland Yes
25 UAE
26 USA
27 Venezuela
Historically,	however,	68	percent	of	federations	that	have	failed	have	been	ethnofederations.	These	data	illustrate
that	there	is	a	case	to	answer,	and	make	India’s	“success”	all	the	more	striking.
Those	opposed	to	federal	homelands	express	concern	that	they	will	increase	the	desire	for	secession.	They
argue	that	it	is	in	the	interests	of	local	elites	to	increase	a	sense	of	separateness,	solidifying	the	boundaries
of	the	group.
They	also	argue	that	ethnofederalism	increases	the	resources	with	which	to	effect	secession.	Thus,	a	Chief
Minister	of	a	state	can	legitimately	claim	a	democratic	mandate	to	oppose	central	policies	as	well	as
securing	control	over	governing	structures	and	security	institutions.
Finally,	concerns	are	raised	that	the	creation	of	ethnic	homelands	will	lead	to	minority	victimization	and
possibly	violence,	which	may	not	be	prevented	(indeed,	it	may	even	be	encouraged)	by	local	control	over
law	enforcement,	as	was	seen	in	Gujarat	in	2002.
These	arguments	are	not	without	merit.	However,	they	rest	on	the	assumption	that	the	creation	of	ethnic
homelands	will	lead	to	secessionist	pressures.			However,	in	India,	rather	than	leading	to	political	balkanisation
and	the	breakup	of	the	country,	linguistic	reorganisation	solidified	support	for	the	Indian	nation.	Not	only	is
secession	never	the	easy	option,	but	a	rallying	cry	for	secession	will	only	be	successful	if	the	group	feels	its
identity	and	interests	are	threatened.	Ethnofederal	institutions	can	create	security	and	the	conditions	where	it
is	not	in	elite	interests	to	pursue	secession.	Elites	need	a	motivation	to	pursue	secessionism	(and	of	course,	the
population	needs	to	be	motivated	to	respond	to	them).
However,	secessionist	movements	have	occurred	in	India	and	there	are	areas	where	India	has	only	managed	to
maintain	its	territorial	integrity	through	the	use	of	extreme	force.	Does	this	indicate	that	territorial	recognition	may
be	dangerous	in	some	instances?	My	research	indicates	that	those	federal	units	that	retain	high	levels	of	diversity
fail	to	increase	the	security	of	the	group	within	that	unit.		Almost	half	of	the	states	of	India	retain	significant
heterogeneity.	In	these	cases	the	dominant	group	feels	threatened	–	as	has	been	in	the	case	of	Assam,
Nagaland	and	Punjab	–	which	often	leads	to	the	targeting	of	minorities.	In	contrast,	after	the	creation	of	the	more
homogeneous	state	of	Mizoram,	it	has	been	much	more	stable.	This	is	a	recommendation	for	the	creation	of	as
homogeneous	units	as	possible.
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In	addition,	territorial	autonomy	when	combined	with	central	power	sharing	significantly	reduces	the	chances	of
violent	conflict.		The	Congress	Party’s	national	reach	ensured	the	nationwide	inclusion	of	groups	within	its	ranks,
and	after	its	decline	of	the	Congress,	coalition	politics	maintained	the	regional	diversity	of	Indian	cabinets,
especially	with	regard	to	maintaining	the	North-South	balance.	When	this	power	sharing	does	not	exist	(or
territorial	autonomy	has	been	downgraded),	conflict	is	more	likely	to	develop.		The	cases	of	Punjab,	Jammu	and
Kashmir	and	most	of	the	Northeastern	states	demonstrate	why	this	is	the	case.	Many	(although	not	all)	of	these
so-called	“peripheral”	states	of	India	have	experienced	a	disproportionate	amount	of	President’s	Rule	applied	to
them:	out	of	the	top	five	States,	three	are	in	the	“peripheral”	regions,	with	Punjab	topping	the	list.
In	both	Punjab	and	Kashmir,	intervention	and	political	meddling	by	the	central	government	provoked	a	violent
response.	In	Kashmir,	the	subject	of	electoral	manipulation	since	the	1950s,	insurgency	did	not	develop	until	the
late	1980s,	after	the	rigging	of	the	1987	election.	This	confirmed	for	many	the	impossibility	of	change	within	the
“system”.		The	securitisation	of	the	response	from	the	centre	through	the	use	of	mechanisms	such	as	the	Armed
Forces	Special	Powers	Act	(AFSPA)		demonstrates	this.	Although	ten	people	lost	their	lives	at	the	hands	of	police
bullets	in	the	Patidar	protests	in	2015,	the	situation	is	incomparable	to	the	use	of	pellet	guns	in	Kashmir	in	2016.
Within	six	months	100	people	were	estimated	to	have	been	killed	and	6,000	injured;	several	of	the	victims	under
ten	years	old.
Support	from	outside	actors	obviously	has	a	role	in	explaining	some	of	the	logistical	support	provided	to	groups
opposed	to	the	Indian	state.	But	the	role	of	the	Central	government	either	in	failing	to	accommodate	the	demands
of	these	groups	demonstrates	that	violent	conflict	cannot	be	divorced	from	the	fact	that	these	states	have	been
treated	differently	from	the	rest	of	the	Union	and	their	effective	autonomy	has	been	reduced	rather	than
increased.		Similar	arguments	about	the	reduction	of	autonomy	increasing	conflict	have	recently	been	made	in
the	case	of	Catalonia.
Policy	implications
Territorial	recognition	promotes	security	and	a	belief	that	the	interests	of	the	group	are	valued	and	protected	by
the	wider	state.		Nowhere	is	this	more	evident	in	the	fact	that	regionalist	political	parties	have	sought	to	capture
central	power	within	the	existing	system	in	India.	In	the	South	Asian	context	therefore,	demands	for	“ethnic”
provinces,	such	as	in	the	Seraiki	region	of	Pakistan	and	in	the	Madhesi		regions	of	Nepal,	should	not	be	feared,
they	are	likely	to	increase	rather	than	decrease	affinity	with	the	central	state.	The	states	of	India	that	have
continued	to	experience	violent	conflict	after	territorial	reorganisation	along	‘ethnic’	lines	have	been	those	in	which
sizeable	pockets	of	diversity	remain	e.g.	Nagaland	and	Assam.
However,	this	comes	with	a	caveat:	such	autonomy	should	be	part	of	a	wider	accommodation	of	groups	within
central	power	structures.	Access	to	central	power	is	important.	India	has	had	an	informal	tradition	of	maintaining	a
north-south	balance	in	governing	institutions:	Modi	would	do	wise	to	remember	this.	The	northern	domination	of
his	cabinet	and	his	government’s	promotion	of	Hindi	above	other	languages	pose	a	challenge	to	India.	In	states
such	as	neighbouring	Myanmar	it	is	important	not	to	pursue	a	majoritarian-led	democratisation.	A	truly
representative	democratisation	is	vital.	The	lessons	from	the	Indian	experience	should	inform	the	constitutional
reconstruction	process	in	other	divided	societies	such	as	the	Philippines	and	Myanmar.
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